August 19, 2026 – Trinseo PLC’s contested confirmation hearing moved into closing arguments Wednesday after three days of testimony on the 2023 and 2025 refinancings, the validity and treatment of approximately $1.5bn of OpCo intercompany claims, the RCF voting position and the structure of the Debtors’ proposed Plan. The Debtors and supporting creditor groups urged Judge Christopher M. Lopez to uphold the transactions and confirm the Plan, while CastleKnight and the Ad Hoc Group of Excluded OpCo Term Lenders continued to press for disallowance, recharacterization or subordination of the intercompany claims and challenged the voting and classification consequences that flow from them.

The Court also heard the separate unfair-discrimination objection of the 2L 2029 Noteholder Group and the U.S. Trustee’s remaining release objection, alongside arguments concerning derivative standing, exclusivity and competing vote-designation motions. Judge Lopez took the matters under advisement following the closing arguments. No date has yet been set for a ruling.

From the Courtroom

Closing arguments in Trinseo PLC’s contested confirmation hearing brought together the disputes that had developed over three days of testimony and a broader set of related motions. Judge Christopher M. Lopez heard final arguments on the validity and treatment of the intercompany claims created through the 2023 and 2025 refinancings, the voting treatment of those claims and the RCF, CastleKnight’s standing and derivative claims, competing vote-designation motions, exclusivity and separate confirmation objections from the 2L 2029 Noteholder Group and the U.S. Trustee. The Debtors and supporting creditor groups urged Judge Lopez to uphold the challenged transactions and confirm the Plan, while CastleKnight and the excluded OpCo lenders argued that the intercompany debt should be disallowed, recharacterized or subordinated and that the Plan’s voting and classification structure could not stand. No ruling was made, and the Court has not yet set a date for its decision.

Ryan Preston Dahl of Latham & Watkins LLP, representing the Debtors, stressed the importance of the outcome to Trinseo and its employees and argued that the adversary proceeding went to the heart of the Plan structure. He first challenged CastleKnight’s standing, contending that its participation in the 2025 refinancing and ownership of 2L Notes subjected it to the OpCo and Super HoldCo intercreditor agreements and the stipulations embedded in that transaction. “It doesn’t matter what hat CastleKnight is wearing, because there’s only one CastleKnight,” Dahl argued, prompting Judge Lopez to stop him and ask what he meant. Dahl clarified that CastleKnight could not separate its capacity as an OpCo Term Lender from its position as a 2L holder when, in the Debtors’ view, the same entity had accepted contractual restrictions barring challenges to the Super HoldCo liens and their priority. He separately argued that CastleKnight acquired approximately $204.0mn of OpCo Term Loans from parties bound by the Mutual Release Agreement and therefore stepped into those lenders’ shoes even though the Debtors do not contend CastleKnight itself became a signatory. On that basis, Dahl argued, CastleKnight lacked standing to pursue the adversary claims regardless of whether the underlying transactions were otherwise valid.

On the merits of the 2023 refinancing, Dahl characterized CastleKnight’s theory as a cascading challenge in which invalidating the AmSty contribution and unrestricted-subsidiary designation would undermine the 2023 financing, eliminate the predicate support for the 2025 transaction and ultimately destabilize the existing capital structure. He argued that Trinseo had sufficient restricted-payment capacity for the AmSty contribution and that CastleKnight’s effort to collapse the July 2023 unrestricted-subsidiary designation into the September refinancing improperly treated later financing steps as though they had already occurred when the subsidiary was designated. Dahl emphasized that the July designation compelled no later transaction, that Trinseo continued evaluating alternatives afterward and that the Oaktree/TPG Angelo Gordon financing was not consummated until September. Even if the relevant steps could be viewed together, he argued, New York law required separate transaction steps to be respected rather than collapsing a financing process that developed over months into a single simultaneous act.

Dahl likewise rejected recharacterization of the intercompany loans, describing the financing as the product of hard-fought negotiations with outside lenders rather than an affiliated borrower and lender simply papering a transaction between themselves. Trinseo expected to repay the intercompany debt, he said, and proceeded on an expectation that the chemical market would recover. Dahl pointed to CFO David P Stasse’s purchase of Trinseo equity shortly after the 2023 refinancing and CastleKnight’s later acquisition of Trinseo shares as evidence that neither side contemporaneously treated bankruptcy as inevitable. He also rejected CastleKnight’s broader lender-control theory, arguing that the record showed independent commercial decisions by the Debtors and the Super HoldCo lenders rather than domination or control.

The Debtors also pressed their motion to designate CastleKnight’s votes, arguing that CastleKnight accumulated a blocking position to support a litigation strategy and that its competing restructuring and DIP proposals depended on unwinding the priority structure it now attacks. Dahl contrasted CastleKnight’s conduct with the Super HoldCo lenders’ acquisition of the RCF, characterizing that purchase as a creditor protecting an existing economic interest while providing additional liquidity. On confirmation itself, he argued that the RCF is impaired under the Plan and that the external OpCo Term Loan Claims and intercompany claims are substantially similar and properly classified together. Judge Lopez asked Dahl about CastleKnight’s contention that access to supporting economics effectively required creditors to accept Plan treatment and provide releases to Super HoldCo. Dahl responded that the Debtors could not reasonably allow a creditor to participate in the backstop while simultaneously seeking to dismantle the restructuring supporting it, describing that situation as putting a “fox in the hen house.”

Kristopher Hansen of Paul Hastings LLP, for the Ad Hoc Group of Senior Secured Creditors, urged Judge Lopez to focus on the actual lender conduct reflected in the record. Hansen argued that the 2023 and 2025 refinancings, RSA and Plan were undertaken in good faith and that the evidence did not establish domination or control by the senior secured group. The 2023 financing, he said, extended maturities, provided liquidity and gave Trinseo time to recover in a difficult operating environment, while the repeated negotiations and competing proposals were inconsistent with CastleKnight’s loan-to-own characterization. Hansen asked Judge Lopez to reject equitable subordination and CastleKnight’s vote-designation motion and emphasized that the applicable intercreditor agreements restrict challenges not only to liens but to their priority.

Todd M. Goren of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, kept the Committee’s closing comparatively narrow. He said the evidentiary record did not support voiding the 2023 or 2025 transactions or subordinating the intercompany claims and argued that the valuation dispute largely falls away if Judge Lopez counts the RCF and intercompany votes and Class 6 remains accepting. Goren also defended the intercompany settlement, telling Judge Lopez that “both the process and the result of the intercompany settlement here were sound and reasonable,” and reaffirmed the Committee’s support for confirmation.

Duane L. Loft of Pallas Partners (US) LLP opened for the Ad Hoc Group of Excluded OpCo Term Lenders by framing the dispute as significant not only to his clients but to the capital markets more broadly. He returned to the lenders’ own description of the 2023 financing as a novel triple-dip structure and argued that the intercompany loans were advanced on terms unavailable from outside lenders against the OpCo collateral pool, documented by the same fiduciary on both sides and never separately negotiated between the affiliated borrower and lender. The record, Loft argued, showed that the intercompany advances should be treated as equity rather than debt.

Loft said the competing presentations made it appear that he and Dahl had been “watching two different movies.” In CastleKnight’s version, the unrestricted-subsidiary designation and later financing steps were an integrated transaction that must be tested together under the OpCo Credit Agreement. The subsidiary designation, he argued, existed to enable the later financing and the subsequent steps would not have occurred without it. On recharacterization, Loft pointed to the absence of separate negotiations between the affiliated entities, the lack of an outside lender willing to make a comparable pari passu loan against OpCo collateral and evidence that the transaction materially increased OpCo’s interest burden. He argued that the intercompany instruments were loans only in form and that their economic purpose was to create a claim for the Super HoldCo lenders against the OpCo collateral pool.

The RCF purchase drew some of the sharpest argument. Loft pointed to contemporaneous lender communications discussing the ability of an RCF purchase to create an impaired accepting class at OpCo and “control plan confirmation,” arguing that the Super HoldCo lenders acquired the facility not simply for investment return but to control both sides of the capital structure in the restructuring. He further argued that RCF borrowings became OpCo obligations while the proceeds entered Trinseo’s consolidated cash pool and supported the enterprise more broadly. When Loft argued that the RCF lenders should be treated as insiders, Judge Lopez interrupted to probe what insider standard applied under the Bankruptcy Code, indicating that he would return to the statutory language and case law rather than simply accept the objectors’ formulation.

Loft also attacked the intercompany settlement as distinct from the investigations conducted by the OpCo and Super HoldCo independent fiduciaries. He argued that the two independent committees did not exchange claims or negotiate the settlement directly with one another and that the agreement instead emerged from restructuring negotiations between the Debtors and Super HoldCo lenders. CastleKnight further argued that the settlement cannot insulate direct creditor claims from scrutiny and that the OpCo intercreditor agreement bars challenges to liens, not challenges to the enforceability of the underlying loans. On classification, Loft argued that an intercompany claim controlled economically by Super HoldCo creditors receiving their principal recovery through Class 5 should not determine the result in Class 6. He also rejected the Debtors’ equal-opportunity defense to the backstop economics, arguing that participation required creditors to surrender valuable rights by signing the RSA and granting releases.

Lydia R. Webb of Gray Reed LLP defended CastleKnight against the Debtors’ bad-faith vote-designation theory. She said CastleKnight had acted as a creditor throughout the case, buying OpCo loans because it believed ultimate recovery would exceed its purchase price and proposing alternative restructurings. Its rejection of a Plan providing such minimal recovery was, Webb argued, ordinary creditor conduct rather than evidence of an ulterior motive. She also attacked the blocking-position theory by noting that CastleKnight was already part of a broader OpCo lender group holding well above the one-third threshold when it crossed 33 and one-third percent individually and continued purchasing claims after reaching that point. Webb said CastleKnight had consistently sought a consensual restructuring and treated litigation as a last resort.

Webb’s request to terminate exclusivity produced one of Judge Lopez’s clearest interventions. She argued that Trinseo’s case and liability-management history warranted allowing competing plans and said CastleKnight remained ready and able to fund an alternative. Judge Lopez immediately focused on what the evidentiary record actually established. “I don’t have any evidence about anyone funding anything,” he said. “Who’s gonna pay for it?” He then connected the problem directly to CastleKnight’s derivative-standing request: “Who’s gonna pay for this litigation?” Judge Lopez cautioned that he could not decide the motions as though their practical consequences did not exist. “I can’t act like I don’t know what happens if I pull certain levers,” he said, before clarifying that his concern was principally with derivative standing rather than the legal standard governing exclusivity.

Andrew N. Rosenberg of Paul Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, for the Ad Hoc Group of 2L 2029 Noteholders, concentrated on the Plan’s 0% recovery for his unsecured class against 100% treatment for general unsecured creditors. Rosenberg argued that the record contained virtually no evidence addressing unfair discrimination and emphasized the breadth of the disparity. He said the 100%-versus-0% treatment was unusually stark and required considerably more justification than the Debtors had placed in the record. He also argued that a lien-subordination agreement did not itself transform the 2L claims into a payment-subordinated class behind every other unsecured creditor.

Counsel for the U.S. Trustee largely rested on the filed objection concerning the Plan’s opt-out release mechanism, telling Judge Lopez that several other issues had been resolved and asking, if the Plan were confirmed, that the proposed confirmation order be circulated to the U.S. Trustee’s office to ensure agreed revisions were reflected.

Dahl used rebuttal to argue that the GUC recovery is a carve-out from Super HoldCo collateral for vendors and other creditors with continuing relationships with Trinseo, unlike the 2L holders. He also returned to CastleKnight, arguing that its supposedly consensual alternatives depended on litigation and pointing again to its participation in the 2025 transaction it now attacks.

Hansen added that all Super HoldCo assets are subject to liens, leaving “nothing to distribute outside the Super HoldCo collateral pool.” Loft responded that the Mutual Release Agreement did not travel with the OpCo loans because it was never incorporated into the Credit Agreement’s definition of “loan documents,” and argued that the Debtors could not rely on the intercreditor agreement if CastleKnight first succeeds in invalidating the underlying 2023 structure. Judge Lopez wrapped up the proceedings, stating: “It’s a lot for me to think about and I’ll get right to work."

Plan Overview

Trinseo PLC and its debtor affiliates filed an amended prepackaged Plan on August 10th, substantially preserving the creditor hierarchy and economic framework contained in the original Plan filed May 26th while adding provisions addressing the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors appointed during the cases, pension and PBGC obligations, collective bargaining agreements and 2029 notes trustee expenses. The Debtors filed a redline comparing the amended Plan with the May version on August 11th.

The Plan continues to leave general unsecured creditors unimpaired while concentrating recoveries on the Debtors’ secured capital structure. Classes 4 through 6 — RCF claims, Super HoldCo 1L claims and OpCo term loan claims — remain impaired and entitled to vote. Unsecured funded debt claims, consisting of Super HoldCo 1L deficiency claims and claims under Trinseo’s 2029 notes, remain impaired and receive no recovery, as do section 510(b) claims and existing Trinseo equity. Other priority, other secured, secured tax and general unsecured claims remain unimpaired and are presumed to accept.

The amended Plan leaves unresolved the principal confirmation objection raised July 31st by an ad hoc group of 2L 2029 noteholders. The group argues that the Plan unfairly discriminates by providing no recovery to Class 7 while leaving Class 8 general unsecured claims unimpaired, including unsecured claims against the same Super HoldCo Debtors that guarantee the notes. The noteholders, whose objection says they hold more than one-third of the approximately $379.5mn tranche, ask either for treatment equivalent to general unsecured claims against the same obligors or an evidentiary showing supporting the differential treatment. The amended Plan does neither: Class 7 remains a zero-recovery class, while Class 8 remains unimpaired.

The amendment also does not narrow Class 8 to trade or other creditors. General unsecured claims continue expressly to include rejection and litigation claims, one of the features cited by the noteholders in arguing that a going-concern rationale cannot explain unimpaired treatment for the entire class. The amended Plan makes that treatment more explicit, providing that Allowed Rejection Claims will be reinstated or otherwise receive treatment rendering them unimpaired.

The principal numerical change to classified funded debt is an approximately $2.9mn increase in allowed RCF principal. The original Plan fixed RCF claims at $347.96mn, while the amended Plan increases that figure to $350.89mn, in each case plus accrued fees, costs and interest. The amended Plan continues to allow Super HoldCo 1L claims at approximately $1.266bn, before deducting any deficiency claims, and OpCo term loan claims at approximately $2.224bn, including $716.25mn of OpCo 2028 term loans and approximately $1.508bn of intercompany term loans.

RCF lenders receive distributable cash to the extent Trinseo emerges with cash above a $125.0mn threshold after specified DIP payments, with any remaining RCF claim satisfied through takeback term loans and/or cash generated through the exit financing process. Super HoldCo 1L lenders continue to receive a distribution built around $810.0mn of takeback term loans and/or cash, reduced by amounts required for the RCF and Super HoldCo DIP roll-up distributions, together with 10% of reorganized common equity and rights to participate in the equity offering. OpCo term loan holders retain the $35.0mn exit distribution of takeback term loans and/or cash plus their applicable subscription rights. Under the intercompany settlement, the OpCo Intercompany Term Lender’s pro rata share of that $35.0mn distribution is instead distributed to Supporting OpCo 2028 Term Lenders through a carve-out of the collateral securing the intercompany claims.

The amended Plan adds a limited accommodation relating to the 2029 notes, although not to the Class 7 claims themselves. Holders of the notes remain in the zero-recovery unsecured funded debt class, but the Debtors must separately pay the 2029 notes trustee’s reasonable and documented administration and counsel expenses in cash, subject to a $250,000 cap. Payment of those expenses through the Effective Date is a condition to consummation, and the Debtors cannot waive that condition without Committee consent.

The exit capital structure also remains intact. The Plan calls for an $850.0mn exit term loan facility, which can consist entirely of third-party new term debt, entirely of takeback debt or a combination of the two depending on the amount Trinseo can syndicate. A separate exit revolving facility must provide at least $200.0mn of commitments. DIP treatment is likewise preserved: OpCo DIP claims are paid in cash, subject to the exclusion of contractual default-rate postpetition interest on rolled-up claims, while Super HoldCo DIP new money claims are paid in cash and Super HoldCo roll-up claims receive the applicable roll-up distribution.

The $450.0mn equity rights offering remains an Effective Date requirement, but the amended Plan changes the corporate mechanics used to deliver that equity. Under the original Plan, the backstop agreements committed parties to purchase reorganized common interests directly; the amended Plan instead requires commitments of at least $450.0mn to purchase Trinseo Materials common stock, with that equity subsequently contributed through the Plan’s new contribution mechanics in exchange for reorganized parent equity. The amended definitions now describe the Super HoldCo contribution as the contribution of Trinseo Materials equity to reorganized parent in exchange for corresponding reorganized common interests.

The economics attached to those instruments remain substantial. The offering includes OpCo 2028 ERO interests with a $60.75mn aggregate purchase price and additional OpCo allocation interests carrying a $40.50mn purchase price, while Super HoldCo creditors receive access to ERO interests with a $79.32mn purchase price and Super HoldCo backstop parties receive allocation interests carrying a $139.50mn aggregate purchase price. The OpCo intercompany component carries a $129.93mn purchase price, bringing the required cash proceeds to $450.0mn. The amended Plan also broadens the definition of an eligible rights-offering participant by adding accredited investors; the May Plan had limited eligibility to qualified institutional buyers and qualifying non-U.S. investors.

Several of the remaining changes track constituencies that became part of the cases after solicitation. The Committee, appointed June 10th, is now included among both the released parties and exculpated parties. The Debtors must consult with the Committee on Plan amendments before and after confirmation, and no such modification may adversely affect the treatment of general unsecured claims. The Committee dissolves automatically on the Effective Date, subject to limited continuing authority over professional-fee matters and appeals from the confirmation order.

The amended Plan also adds detailed provisions addressing collective bargaining agreements, pension plans and PBGC obligations that were not included in the original Plan. Collective bargaining agreements in force on the Effective Date will be assumed, subject to payment of applicable cure claims. Trinseo LLC and Aristech Surfaces LLC will continue responsibility for the Arkema and Aristech pension plans, respectively, and the reorganized Debtors must fund any shortfall necessary to complete the pending standard termination of the Aristech plan, comply with minimum-funding requirements and pay PBGC premiums. The Plan expressly preserves PBGC and pension-plan enforcement rights under ERISA and the tax code rather than allowing the Plan’s discharge, release or injunction provisions to eliminate those liabilities.

Case Summary

Trinseo PLC and 12 affiliates filed prepackaged Chapter 11 cases in the Southern District of Texas on May 26th with approximately $2.9bn of funded debt, excluding intercompany term loans, and $2.3bn of assets against $3.4bn of total liabilities as of year-end 2025. The Wayne, Pennsylvania-based company manufactures plastics, latex binders and specialty polymers through 32 manufacturing plants and one recycling facility across 28 sites in 14 countries, employs approximately 2,800 people and generated approximately $3.0bn of 2025 net sales.

The filing followed several years of declining chemical-sector conditions and a sharp prepetition liquidity squeeze. Trinseo cites global overcapacity, pricing pressure, weak demand across construction, automotive, consumer electronics and wellness applications, European energy costs, geopolitical disruption and customer destocking. Consolidated net sales fell from $3.675bn in 2023 to $2.975bn in 2025, and management does not expect a meaningful demand recovery before 2027. First-quarter 2026 results showed net sales down 8.0% year-over-year to $724.7mn, a $115.9mn net loss, $78.7mn of net interest expense and negative free cash flow of $244.2mn. Trade-credit contraction and higher oil-linked raw material and working-capital costs compounded the pressure, while gross profit of $61.7mn was below quarterly net interest expense.

By March, Trinseo had elected not to make approximately $10.0mn of interest payments on its 7.625% second lien secured notes due 2029 and approximately $12.0mn under its senior credit agreement. The missed payments triggered defaults and cross-defaults under the SuperPriority Revolver, Refinance Credit Agreement and receivables securitization facility, moving an already strained balance sheet into a defaulted capital structure before the Petition Date.

The RSA is intended to reduce funded debt by approximately $2.0bn and annual interest expense by approximately $140.0mn. It is supported by holders of approximately 78.0% of funded debt, excluding the $1.508bn of OpCo Intercompany Term Loans and the securitization program, including 100.0% of RCF Claims, approximately 99.9% of Super HoldCo 1L Claims and approximately 86.0% of OpCo Term Loan Claims. The structure reflects the division created by Trinseo’s 2023 and 2025 financing transactions, with one creditor constituency holding Super HoldCo / HoldCo-side debt and another holding the external OpCo 2028 Term Loans.

Existing lenders are expected to own substantially all reorganized equity, subject to a 10.0% MIP. Before MIP dilution, HoldCo-side creditors are allocated approximately 78.31% of the equity through direct distributions, subscription rights, exclusive rights-offering allocations and backstop premiums, while the OpCo 2028 Term Loan constituency receives approximately 21.69%. The restructuring includes a $450.0mn equity rights offering, an $850.0mn exit term loan and an exit revolver of at least $200.0mn. RCF Claims receive distributable cash or takeback debt; Super HoldCo 1L lenders receive takeback or cash value, 10.0% of reorganized equity and rights-offering participation; and OpCo 2028 lenders receive a $35.0mn exit distribution and rights-offering economics. The 2029 Notes Claims receive no recovery, GUCs remain unimpaired and existing equity is canceled.

The principal complication is CastleKnight. CastleKnight holds $271.8mn of 2028 OpCo Term Loans and $93.5mn of 2L Notes, while the broader Ad Hoc Group of Excluded OpCo Term Lenders holds $293.7mn, or approximately 40.0%, of the external OpCo term loan tranche. The group has filed an adversary proceeding challenging the 2023 and 2025 LMEs, objected to the Disclosure Statement and attacked the DIP’s roll-up and fee economics. Its position is that the transactions improperly shifted collateral and value toward Super HoldCo creditors, created or enlarged disputed intercompany claims and allowed those claims to overwhelm the votes of external OpCo lenders in the proposed Plan class.

That position could block acceptance if the external OpCo term loans are placed in a separate impaired class. The Debtors instead classify them with approximately $1.508bn of OpCo Intercompany Term Loan Claims under a settlement that allows the intercompany principal and related interest while disallowing approximately $175.9mn of make-whole, yield-protection and similar amounts. CastleKnight’s posture recalls its recent LYCRA strategy, where a much smaller minority position produced a settlement carrying value outside ordinary plan treatment. In Trinseo, however, CastleKnight begins with a materially larger position and a direct challenge to the Plan’s voting architecture.

The Court has allowed the restructuring to proceed notwithstanding that dispute. On June 17th, Judge Christopher Lopez entered final orders approving a $427.5mn two-facility DIP package, consisting of $142.5mn of new money and $285.0mn of roll-up loans across a $270.0mn OpCo facility and $157.5mn Super HoldCo facility. The Court also approved a separate $150.0mn receivables securitization program. After the Debtors certified that no objections to final DIP approval remained, the Court entered the orders without a further contested hearing and the June 18th DIP, cash-management and securitization hearing was canceled.

On July 30th, CastleKnight and the excluded OpCo lenders survived the principal threshold challenge to their adversary proceeding. Judge Lopez denied motions for judgment on the pleadings as to Counts I through III, while dismissing Count IV against the OpCo revolver lender defendants without prejudice and permitting amendment. In a companion ruling, the Court reserved for trial automatic-stay issues relating to Counts II and III. The rulings leave the core LME and intercompany dispute alive heading into confirmation rather than resolving it against the excluded lenders.

Confirmation also faces a separate challenge from holders of the 2029 notes. On July 31st, an ad hoc group holding approximately $136.3mn, or 35.9%, of the approximately $379.5mn tranche objected on unfair-discrimination grounds. The group argues that the Plan provides a 0% recovery to the notes as Class 7 Unsecured Funded Debt Claims while leaving Class 8 General Unsecured Claims unimpaired, even where both classes hold unsecured claims against the same Super HoldCo Debtors. The noteholders point to the Debtors’ own Liquidation Analysis, which estimates approximately $50.0mn of General Unsecured Claims within the Super HoldCo silo, and seek either treatment equivalent to Class 8 claims against the same obligors or an evidentiary justification for the disparity.

The Liquidation Analysis gives that objection a concrete economic basis. It estimates $409.5mn to $495.8mn of net liquidation proceeds in the Super HoldCo silo, producing estimated Chapter 7 recoveries of 20% to 27% for Super HoldCo 1L Claims and zero recovery for both approximately $422.8mn of Unsecured Funded Debt Claims and approximately $50.0mn of General Unsecured Claims. Under the Plan, by contrast, the Debtors estimate recoveries of 60% to 78% for Super HoldCo 1L Claims, zero for Unsecured Funded Debt Claims and 100% for GUCs.

On August 10th, the Debtors filed an amended Plan that preserves the restructuring’s core economic treatment. The amended Plan increases the allowed principal amount of RCF Claims to approximately $350.9mn but continues to provide no recovery to Class 7 Unsecured Funded Debt Claims while leaving Class 8 General Unsecured Claims unimpaired. The amendment separately provides for payment of up to $250,000 of the 2029 notes trustee’s fees and expenses, but does not provide a recovery on the 2029 Notes Claims themselves.