BankruptcyData platform providing real-time bankruptcy and restructuring intelligence

Urban One, Inc.
Radio Decline and Digital Growth

by Howard Wu |  Sep 8, 2026, 10:15:30 PM   

We wrote about radio broadcaster Mediaco Holding Inc. last week. Admittedly, we didn’t really go into the reason for the revenue decline. But, in fairness, it doesn’t take a rocket man to figure out why radio has been depressed. But just in case our readers were curious…

Radio broadcasters generate revenue primarily through the sale of advertising to local, regional, and national spot advertisers. The greater the audience reach (measured via Nielsen Audio), the higher the advertising rate a broadcaster can command.

(Not) Forever Young…

In 1Q’26, the average U.S. consumer spent ~4 hours daily listening to some sort of ad-supported audio. Amongst people over the age of 35, radio took up 68% of that time. For the 18-34 age cohort, radio accounted for just 45%. To be honest, the numbers aren’t necessary – just ask your kids if they’re still listening to AM radio (they’re not). Radio broadcasters have been feeling the sting of an ageing audience and there has been no shortage of names in distress over the years: iHeartMedia, Inc., Cumulus Media Inc., Audacy Inc, Beasley Media Group.

When one legacy business door closes…

A digital growth window opens. Radio broadcasters obviously saw the writing on the wall and started ramping up their podcasting content, online streaming platforms, and other digital media products. While traditional terrestrial radio seems to be going the way of the dinosaurs, digital has been the cool new kid on the block. It’s not hard to see why.

Consumers prefer streaming because it’s a convenient, on-demand, and personalized listening experience with vast libraries of content. Creators (e.g., podcast hosts) migrated to digital because it gave them more control over their product while also having the World Wide Web as their targetable market instead of just a local metro area. Advertising embedded into their content also means they control the brands they partner with and allows them to pocket most of the proceeds. The streaming platforms themselves also have significant advantages over traditional radio since digital allows for the collection of much more in-depth listener data, which advertisers can then use to power optimization efforts.

To really drive the point home here, the entire radio advertising industry depends on Nielsen Audio for its market ratings. To get those ratings, in some cases, Nielsen sends out a “diary” to a sample of participants. Participants then write down their listening habits and physically mail the diary back to Nielsen. Nielsen then uses these samples to extrapolate for the entire market.

Compare that to digital, where every time a listener tunes in, the platform pulls their entire profile (think location, demographic, listening preferences). This allows for “programmatic” advertising where advertisers buy ad space through a real-time bidding process and can choose their exact audience preferences.

So why weren’t radio broadcasters successful in their digital growth initiatives? A couple of reasons. First, it was a little too late. By the time radio broadcasters started investing in digital, it was already near impossible to compete against entrenched digital platforms like Spotify and Apple Podcasts. They had more data, more content, and just a better digital ecosystem. Second, digital can be expensive. Spotify entered into a non-exclusive deal for The Joe Rogan Experience in 2024 for a whopping $250mm. A radio broadcaster can’t afford that when their only source of cash flow comes from a legacy cigar-butt business. Third, most of these radio broadcasters were laden with debt that made it even harder to commit fully to the digital transition.

Now an Example…

Urban One, Inc. (f/k/a Radio One, Inc.) owns and operates 76 broadcast stations in 13 markets primarily targeted at African American and urban consumers. The radio business has historically represented most of the Company’s revenue, but multi-media is the name of the game now. Aside from Radio Broadcasting, Urban One also has a syndicated radio show segment (“Reach Media”), a digital segment, and a cable TV segment.

Total revenue has dropped from $485mm in FY’22 to $374mm in FY’25, or a 22.7% decline. For that period, by segment, Radio declined 11.2%, Reach Media declined 27.8%, Digital declined 39.1%, and Cable TV declined 24.2%. EBITDA sits at $57mm for FY’25 and continues to shrink with LTM EBITDA currently booked at $46mm.

The debt side has been volatile as well. Urban One completed a debt exchange at the tail end of 2025 that reduced total indebtedness by >$100mm and extended the maturity wall from 2028 to 2030/2031. The Company has also continuously repurchased the outstanding second lien notes at below par prices (average of 42c on the dollar for 2Q’26), reducing the amount outstanding on that piece of paper from $291mm at the end of FY’25 to $235mm as of 2Q’26. After adding on $61mm outstanding in first lien notes and $20mm in an ABL facility, gross debt lands at ~$323mm.

You would think that after all the discounted buybacks of the second lien notes, Urban One would be in a better place leverage-wise… You’d be wrong. At the end of FY’25 (post the debt exchange), net leverage was 6.1x. As of 2Q’26, net leverage is sitting pretty at 6.7x.

While net debt decreased by >$40mm (or 11.5%), EBITDA has fallen by ~$10mm (or 18%). It’s a race between management’s deleveraging efforts and the Company’s deteriorating financials.

And it does seem like the deteriorating financials side is winning. Management originally guided FY’26 EBITDA towards $70mm at the end of FY’25. Management cut that number to $60mm by 1Q’26 and then revised down again to mid-$50mm by 2Q’26. Keep in mind, it’s also a political year, so 2H’26 could swing the fiscal year numbers wildly. But by most metrics, 1H’26 has been abysmal. Revenue for 1H’26 is down 11.1% vs 1H’25, EBITDA margins fell from 14.6% in 1H’25 to 10% for 1H’26, and net leverage is up about half a turn. This has caused the second lien bonds to drop to ~34c on the dollar compared to ~50c earlier this year.

A couple of things the Company is doing right…

Other than maybe the deleveraging efforts. Management has been active in finding accretive acquisition targets. In 1Q’26, Urban One acquired 2 radio stations in Dallas for $22mm while also disposing of 3 non-cash-generating stations. According to management, that netted out to ~$11mm in acquisition costs against $5mm in potential PF EBITDA. The Company is also still EBITDA and FCF positive, and given the recently pushed-out maturity wall, there’s still a decent runway here for management to figure out a plan.

But does the acquisition of secularly declining (albeit cheap) radio stations change any of the overarching narrative? What’s the turnaround story here? Digital has not been the golden goose growth driver, radio is still in secular decline, and leverage remains high even despite management’s efforts.

Are we close to zombie company territory, where creditors just sweep what little cash flow towards debt costs?

Spotify, cue Thriller by Michael Jackson.